We study a sample of divestitures that alter the divisional organizational structure of diversified firms. We find that these firms experience substantial increases in firm value around the reorganization. Firms that continue to operate as diversified firms cut back on divisional investment levels and display improvements in the allocation of capital across divisions. Firms that refocus to become single segment firms significantly increase the investment of the surviving division. We find that improvements in the efficiency with which internal capital markets allocate investment are an important determinant of the gains from divestitures. Divestitures also enhance firm value by providing a source of funding for financially constrained segments.
I. Introduction
A standard view in financial theory is that corporate diversification destroys firm value. , Berger and Ofek (1995) , Servaes (1996) , and Denis and Thothadri (1999) , among others, show that diversified firms trade at a substantial discount relative to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone firms. There is a substantial literature that explores the reasons for this diversification discount. A leading explanation is that diversified firms adopt suboptimal divisional investment policies. Lamont (1997) , for example, shows that diversified oil companies cut back on investment in non-oil divisions when oil prices declined during the 1980s. Shin and Stulz (1998) find that divisional resources do not appear to be redirected to segments with the most favorable investment opportunities. Scharfstein (1998) shows that misallocation of resources between divisions is most pronounced when management has a small ownership stake and suggests that agency costs underlie distortions in divisional allocation. If firms do not allocate funds efficiently across divisions, poor internal capital markets may explain why diversified conglomerates trade at a discount relative to a comparable portfolio of stand-alone single segment firms.
If corporate diversification destroys value, we should observe a systematic pattern of firms undoing diversification. Comment and Jarrell (1995) present evidence of a clear trend towards corporate focusing in the US. They argue that this restructuring has had a positive effect of the values on refocusing firms. Further, Berger and Ofek (1996) show that firms with greater value losses due to diversification are more likely to be taken over and broken up. Scharfstein (1998) shows that a majority of diversified firms in the late 1970s became undiversified by the mid 1990s.
Although the trend towards undoing diversification is well documented, the sources of gains underlying corporate focusing are less well understood. Our paper explores whether changes in divisional investment allocation are responsible for some of the gains in corporate focusing events.
We explore the impact of undoing diversification on firms' divisional investment policy by using a sample of diversified firms that divest a segment. For these firms, we examine how the divestiture affects the allocation of resources among the firm's remaining segments. We seek to understand how these focusing activities affect the internal allocation of investment. We explore the predictions of four specific explanations offered for the source of gains underlying corporate refocusing events.
First, we explore the hypothesis that undoing diversification is associated with an improvement in the allocation efficiency of internal capital markets. If firms divest segments that contribute to distorted divisional investment policies, then an improvement in internal capital markets should be observed when such divisions are divested. According to this internal capital markets hypothesis, divestitures increase firm value due to an increased efficiency with which divisional investment allocations are made. Lang, Poulson, and Stulz (1995) identify another potential source of gains in divestitures.
They argue that asset sales often represent an expedient mechanism for raising financing when frictions in external capital markets limit the opportunities for raising capital. Under this financing hypothesis, divestitures raise capital and relax financial constraints, enabling firms to undertake valuable investments that would otherwise be foregone. In the context of divisional investment, the financing hypothesis suggests that divestitures should be associated with increased investment levels, particularly for those divisions where frictions in internal capital markets prevent all positive NPV projects to be undertaken.
The internal capital markets and financing hypotheses are not independent. In Stein (1997) , headquarters engages in winner-picking, where funds are transferred to divisions. This occurs at the expense of looser-sticking, the practice of transferring funds away from some divisions that have less attractive, but positive NPV projects. In Stein's framework, this active reallocation by internal capital markets creates value by relaxing capital constraints for the firm, even though looser divisions forego positive NPV projects. If breaking up the internal capital market further exacerbates credit constraints, Stein's argument would suggest that firm value is reduced as a result of this change in divisional investment policy. However, the financing hypothesis of Lang, Poulsen, and Stulz (1995) suggests that these looser divisions would be able to increase investment and allow them to pursue the value-maximizing investment policy.
While the internal capital markets and the financing hypotheses make specific predictions on how divestitures lead to changes in divisional investment policy, other explanations for the source of gains from divestitures make no specific predictions. For example, Hite and Owers (1983) argue that the gain from redeployment of assets to higher valued users is an important source of value improvement from asset sales. According to this explanation, firms choose to sell assets because a third party places a higher valuation on the asset than the firm expects to realize from its current deployment. Fluck and Lynch (1999) develop a theory where firms acquire divisions that would be unable to obtain financing for marginally acceptable investments. They argue that internal capital markets provide a more efficient means of funding such divisions. When divisions become profitable, external capital market financing becomes more efficient. In their analysis, the investors view a divestiture positively because it signals that the divisions have been profitable. Unlike the first two hypotheses, the asset redeployment and the signaling hypotheses do not predict any change in divisional investment policy.
Our paper attempts to shed some light on the explanations for the diversification discount and the literature on corporate focusing. A number of recent studies have questioned the premise that diversification hurts firm value. Hyland (1999) and Campa and Kedia (1999) argue that diversifying firms tend to trade at a discount prior to becoming diversified. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (1999) show that acquired firms tend to trade at a substantial discount prior to becoming part of a diversified firm. Chevalier (2000) argues that selection biases and measurement error are largely responsible for the documented diversification discount. Fluck and Lynch (1999) also argue that poor prior performance causes firms to diversify. According to these arguments, self-selection biases and measurement error might be responsible for much of the diversification discount. Evidence that changes in the degree of diversification affect both firm value and divisional investment policy would suggest that the diversification discount is unlikely to be entirely an artifact of selection bias and measurement error.
Our approach is complementary to recent work by Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (1999) that examines how the investment behavior of divisions is altered following a spin-off. While these authors focus on the investment of the division that leaves the firm, our paper explores whether the divestiture of a division influences the investment behavior of the firm's remaining divisions. Gertner et al (1999) show that the improvement in investment decisions for the spun-off subsidiaries is useful in understanding the gains from spin-offs. In our paper, we explore the degree to which changes in investment patterns of retained segments help explain the valuation effects of refocusing transactions.
Our analysis is also closely related to Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (1999) who explore the importance of the internal capital markets, the financing, and the asset redeployment hypotheses in the context of asset sales. They use these hypotheses to develop predictions regarding the determinants of the segment that is divested. The focus in their paper is on predicting which segments are divested during corporate focusing. In contrast, the emphasis in our analysis is understanding whether asset sales affect subsequent divisional investment policy. While these questions are clearly related, our paper complements their work by providing evidence on how internal capital allocations change following asset sales.
Our paper is also related to Lamont and Polk (2000) who examine changes in the degree of diversity among investment opportunities for divisions over time. They find that industry shocks that change the degree of diversity of opportunities among segments leads to changes in firm value. In contrast to their work, which focuses on exogenous changes in diversity, our analysis concentrates on endogenous restructuring choices by firms. We seek to understand whether endogenous events of corporate refocusing are associated with improvements in the functioning of internal capital markets.
In addition, we examine whether improvements in divisional investment policy represent an important source of gains for shareholders of refocusing firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the sample construction process and the nature of divestitures in the sample. Section III examines changes in value around refocusing. In Section IV, we examine how the internal investment policies of the firm's remaining divisions are altered after the divestiture. Section V explores the link between changes in value and changes in investment policies. Section VI concludes.
II. Sample
Our source of segment level data is the COMPUSTAT segment tapes. Since 1977, firms have been required to report data on business segments that account for more than 10% of consolidated profits, sales, or assets. Our sample selection process seeks to identify divestitures of business segments that correspond closely to the segment level data reported in COMPUSTAT.
We start by identifying all firms on the segment tapes that report a decrease in the number of segments between 1983 and 1994. We find 4,111 firm-years in Compustat where the number of segments is at least one less than in the prior year for the firm. As reported by Hyland (1999) , firms often change the number of reported segments without changing their assets or operating activities.
This necessitates careful screening of the Compustat firms so that a reliable sample of firms that drop a business segment can be created. We therefore match this list with a corresponding list of firms that either divested assets or spun-off units during this period. We compile this list of divestitures and spin-offs using the Securities Data Corp. database. For a divestiture to enter our sample, we require that COMPUSTAT reports at least one less segment and that the firm simultaneously engages in a divestiture or spin-off. This requirement results in a sample of 1,268 divestitures by 624 firms in 769 firm-years. 1 However, in several instances, we find that the divested assets belong to divisions other 1 Since we are interested in identifying divestitures that are associated with a decline in the number of reported segments, the divestitures that enter our sample tend to be relatively large. This occurs despite the fact that in several than those for which reporting ceases in COMPUSTAT. Therefore, to ensure a sample where we can reliably identify a divestiture as corresponding to the segment data, we examine the 3-digit SIC codes of the dropped segment and of the divested division. In addition, we also search Lexis-Nexis in the year surrounding the SDC announcement date to verify the event occurred and that the divestiture corresponds to the business segment that ceases reporting. Of the 769 firm-years where the firm drops a segment and divests assets, we find 431 firm-years where the divested assets belong to the segment that ceases reporting on the segment tapes. This sample of 431 firm years of organizational changes represents 388 different firms that reduce the number of segments and where we can verify that assets belonging to the dropped segment(s) were divested.
We further screen the sample and remove 54 observations in which the firm has a major restructuring in the event year. We consider an event to be a major restructuring if all of the firm's segments change their 3-digit SIC code or if the firm divests or changes the 3-digit SIC code of more than 50% of its retained segments. 2 We also remove 45 additional observations because these firms are incorporated outside the US and 22 observations where the divesting firm operates primarily in the financial industry (primary SIC code in the 6000s). Lastly, we drop 32 observations where the firm has more than one divestiture within a 3-year period. A 3-year period is employed because some of our tests examine investment policy for the 3 years before and after the divestiture. This procedure results in a final sample of 278 organizational changes.
Although the overwhelming majority of events in the sample (263 of 278) are divestitures, 15 firms refocus by spinning off a division. For the purpose of our analysis, an important distinction between divestitures and spin-offs is that the latter mechanism does not provide an inflow of funds to the parent firm, since the shares in the subsidiary are distributed to existing stockholders. Thus, the instances, firms engage in multiple divestitures to exit a particular business segment. Using data on transaction values from SDC, the mean size of divestitures in our sample is $113 million, relative to $77.5 million for divestitures that do not enter our sample. The difference is size is more pronounced in the medians. The median value of divestitures in the sample is $51 million, compared to $24 million for divestitures not in our sample. 2 An example of this restructuring is NL Industries. In 1986, NL reported 4 segments with SIC codes 7359, 3533, 2899, and 3533. In 1987 , the firm reported 2 segments with the SIC codes 2899 and 2816. Thus, only the segment financing hypothesis is unlikely to be applicable to refocusings involving spin-offs. In untabulated tests, we have conducted all the analysis restricting the sample to include only divestitures, and obtain results similar to those estimated with the full sample. Throughout the paper, we report results using the full sample that includes spin-offs, and for convenience, refer to all events as divestitures.
Panel A of Table 1 shows the distribution of the firms over the sample period. Divestitures are spread evenly during the sample period, but are slightly less frequent in 1983 and 1992. Panel B
shows the availability of segment data for the seven years surrounding the divestiture. Data for the full sample of 278 firms is available in 275 cases for entire 3 years prior to the divestiture. In the three-year period after the divestiture, the sample size drops to 225, indicating that some of the sample firms are acquired or are delisted subsequent to the divestiture. As expected from the sample construction process, there is a substantial decline in the number of segments around year 0. Our sample consists of 913 segments in year -1, which declines to 563 segments in year 0. The decline in segments exceeds 278, the number of firms in the sample, because several firms divest more than one segment. As shown in Panel C, 224 firms divest only one segment, 44 divest two segments, 8 divest 3 segments, and 5 firms divest 4 segments.
In 134 cases, the divestiture results in the firm becoming a single segment firm. Since several tests involve examining how the functioning of internal capital markets change following a divestiture, these tests are conducted on the 144 firms that continue to operate as diversified firms following the divestiture. We refer to these 144 firms that remain diversified as diversified refocusers. Firms that become single segment firms after the divestiture are referred to as single segment refocusers. Table 1 reports the distribution of the observations according to whether they are diversified or single segment refocusers.
One issue worth noting is that although COMPUSTAT reports fewer segments following the divestiture, this does not imply that all the assets of that segment have, in fact, been divested. Since with SIC code 2899 remained after the divestitures. The firm divested the other 3 segments and added one segment with a new SIC code.
firms are only required to report segment data on segments that comprise at least 10% of the firm's profits, sales, or assets, it is possible that a partial divestiture could result in a smaller segment that accounts for less than 10% of the firm's operations. In this case, the unobserved segment could continue to affect a firm's divisional investment policy, albeit to a lesser degree. Such instances lower the likelihood that we detect significant shifts in internal investment policies. In this regard, the power of our tests to detect meaningful shifts in investment patterns is reduced, and the changes that we document should be viewed as conservative estimates of changes that might occur in instances of complete divestitures. Table 2 shows that the median size of divested segments in year -1 is $62 million, while that of retained segments is $189 million. Sixty-eight percent of the sample firms divest their smallest segment, confirming the pattern in Schlingemann et al (1999) that firms are most likely to divest their smallest segment. However, unlike their sample, 30% of our sample also divests their largest segment.
Lack of market valuations for segments prevents direct calculation of the segment q ratios.
We therefore follow prior work and measure the investment opportunities of divisions by computing each segment's imputed q ratio. The imputed q of a segment is computed as the median q of standalone firms in the same 3-digit SIC code as the segment of the diversified firm, as long as there are at least 5 firms in the industry. Otherwise, the median for those in the same 2-digit SIC code is used.
We use the market to book ratio as a proxy for q. We calculate q at the beginning of the year where the investment decisions have to be made. The median imputed q for divested segments in the year prior to the divestiture is 1.27, while that of retained divisions is also 1.27.
Meyers, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) argue that divisions with poor investment prospects will engage in rent seeking because the opportunity cost of rent seeking behavior is the least for these divisions. According to these models, diversified firms stand to gain the most by divesting divisions with relatively poor investment opportunities. However, only 43% of firms in our sample divest their lowest q division. About half of the firms (49.6%) divest a division with a imputed q lower than the median q of all of the firm's segments, while half divest a high q segment. In fact, 38% of sample firms divest their highest q division. We also employ the ratio of cash flow to assets as a supplementary measure of divisional performance. Even with this measure, the data suggest a high frequency of divestitures of well performing divisions. In 30.6% of cases, the segment with the highest cash flow ratio is divested.
Using cash flow as a measure of divisional performance, the worst performing divisions face the greatest likelihood of divestiture. In 57.8% of cases, firms divest the division with the lowest cash flow and, in 66.8%, firms divest a division with a below median cash flow. Overall, the data suggest that firms tend to divest their best or worst performing divisions more frequently than other divisions.
This pattern is consistent with similar findings by Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walkling (1999) , who also show that firms are just as likely to divest high q divisions, as they are to divest low q divisions.
According to Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (1999) , misallocation of divisional investment is most severe when there is substantial dispersion in the investment opportunities of the divisions. We examine the extent to which the divestiture changes this dispersion. We do so by computing the difference between the variance of the segments' imputed q prior to the divestiture in year t-1 and the variance of imputed q after the divestitures in year t+1. This difference will be large when firms divest segments that contribute greatly to the variance of imputed q across the firm's segments. Table   2 shows that for firms that remain diversified, the variance of segment q drops by 0.12, and the decline is significant at the 1% level. However, not all divestitures result in a reduced variance of segment investment opportunities. We find that the variance of imputed q declines in 58.2% of cases, but that it rises in the remaining 41.8% of firms.
We also compute a diversity measure similar to that used in Rajan, et al (2000) , the salesweighted standard deviation of imputed q divided by the average imputed q of all of the firm's segments. We compute the difference between the weighted standard deviation in years t-1 and t+1.
This difference measures the degree to which the divestiture decreases the diversity among segments.
On average, sample firms exhibit an increase in diversity after the divestiture. A decrease in diversity is observed in only 26.4% of the sample.
Despite the increase in diversity, there is evidence that the divestiture increases the firms' focus after the divestiture. We use two measures of the extent to which a divestiture increases focus.
First, we follow John and Ofek (1995) and compute the sales-based Herfindahl index. This index is computed across all the business segments as the sum of the squared segment sales, relative to firm sales. The second measure of focusing, following prior work by Schipper and Smith (1983) and John and Ofek (1995) , is based on whether the divested segment shares its industrial classification with the firm's primary classification. We classify a divestiture as focusing if its 3 digit SIC code differs from the primary SIC code reported for the firm in Compustat. A drawback of this measure, however, is that it ignores relatedness across divisions as a result of complementarities or vertical integration, which are not captured by SIC codes. Table 2 shows the change in the sales-based Herfindahl index around the divestiture. The change is significantly positive, indicating a greater concentration among the firm's segments. Using SIC codes to indicate focus, we find that the majority of events are classified as focusing. Almost 79% of the sample divests a non-core segment, similar to the pattern shown by Schlingemann et al (1999) .
III. Valuation Effects of Refocusing
As a first step in understanding the effects of refocusing on internal capital markets, we examine how firm value changes around the divestiture. We use the Berger and Ofek (1995) methodology to estimate the difference between the market value of the multi-segment firm and the value the firm would have had if all its segments were priced as stand-alone firms. Specifically, we compute their excess value measure using a sales multiplier as follows:
where V is the sum of market value of equity and book value of assets less the book value of equity and deferred taxes at time -1, I(V) is the imputed firm value at time -1, Sales i is the segment i's sales at time 0, M i (V/Sales) MS is the sales multiplier (calculated as the median of the single-segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code industry) at time -1, and n is the number of segments per firm at time 0. Table 3 shows the excess value for sample firms, according to whether they are diversified or single segment refocusers. In the year before refocusing, diversified refocusers are valued at a substantial discount relative to stand-alone firms. The mean excess value for year -1 is -0.33 and significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The mean excess value improves after the divestiture to -0.25. Inspection of medians indicates a similar improvement in excess value. The improvement in excess value is statistically significant at the 10% level using a t-test and at the 5% level using a Wilcoxon test. It is worth noting, however, that both mean and median excess value continue to be significantly negative after the divestiture, indicating that refocusing firms that remain diversified continue trading at a (albeit smaller) discount. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that diversification's effect on firm value is most negative when a firm goes from operating as a single segment firm to operating as a 2-segment firm. Thus, we might expect that moving in the opposite direction -from two segments to one -should be highly beneficial to firm value. Table 3 shows a large improvement in excess value is also observed in firms that refocus to become single segment firms. Before refocusing, these firms are also valued at a discount relative to stand-alone firms. For these firms, the mean excess value in year -1 is -0.23.
After refocusing, excess value rises to -0.14. Inspection of medians reveals a much larger increase in excess value. Median excess value rises from -0.32 in year -1 to -0.06 in year +1 and a Wilcoxon test indicates the change to be statistically significant. Nonetheless, these firms continue to trade at a discount relative to stand-alone firms, even though they become single segment firms after the refocusing.
IV.
Divisional Investment Patterns IV. A. Univariate Analysis Table 4 shows the investment allocation for segments before and after the divestiture. We compute each segment's investment allocation as the ratio of capital expenditures to sales for the segment. Since we are comparing investment outlays surrounding a divestiture, our comparison will be affected by the investment of the divested division. For example, if a firm were to divest a capital intensive division, we would observe a decline in the ratio of investment to assets surrounding the divestiture even when there are no other changes in the firm's investment policy. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we compare only the retained divisions of the firm both before and after the divestiture to ensure comparability of the results.
Before the refocusing, the median investment allocation is 7.4% and does not change significantly after the refocusing. Investment allocation is 8% after the divestiture. To understand how this compares to investment by stand-alone firms, we also compute the relative investment allocation. Relative investment allocation is measured as the difference between investment allocation for the sample segment and the median investment allocation of stand-alone firms in the same 3 digit SIC code. In year -1, average relative investment allocation is 0.3%, indicating that investment by segments of divesting firms is virtually identical to investment by stand-alone firms.
After the refocusing, relative investment allocation is 1.3% and is significantly different from zero.
This suggests a slight rise in relative investment levels, though the change in relative investment allocation for the entire sample lacks significance.
For the subsample of refocusers that remain diversified, there is no evidence of a change in investment levels either on an absolute level, or relative to other stand-alone firms. These results do not support the financing hypothesis that predicts increased investment levels for the retained divisions following the refocusing. Therefore, for diverse refocusers, gains from refocusing do not appear to be explained by the potential relaxation of financial constraints arising from the proceeds from divestitures. 3 We perform the same analysis on the subsample of single segment refocusers. Mean investment allocation for these firms rises from 9.3% in year -1 to 9.7% in year +1, but the change lacks statistical significance. We also compute the investment allocation relative to stand-alone single segment firms that do not divest. Relative to investment by the non-divesting, stand-alone firms, segment investment by refocusing firms is slightly less prior to refocusing, but not significantly so.
Thus, relative to other stand-alone firms, single segment refocusers also do not appear to be constrained prior to refocusing. After the refocusing, both mean and median relative investment allocation is significantly positive, indicating that these segments display a relative increase in investment after refocusing. This result is potentially consistent with the financing hypothesis.
To explore the financing hypothesis in more detail, we classify all segments in the sample as constrained or unconstrained. According to the financing hypothesis, divestitures are a means to raise capital to provide funding for segments that are constrained and hence invest less than the optimal level. This hypothesis therefore predicts that investment should increase for constrained segments after the divestiture, but a similar increase should not be observed for unconstrained segments.
We classify a segment as constrained if its relative investment allocation is negative -i.e. it invests less than stand-alone firms. Segments are classified as unconstrained if relative investment allocation is positive. Panel B of Table 4 shows how investment changes for constrained segments.
For segments of diverse refocusers, investment rises from 3% in year -1 to 5% in year +1, and the increase in investment is significant at the 5% level using both a t-test and a Wilcoxon signed rank test. Relative investment allocation is -4% in year -1 and rises to -2% in year +1 and the change is significant using a Wilcoxon test. Thus, for diverse refocusers, investment in constrained segments increases substantially after refocusing. However, it is worth noting that even after refocusing, relative investment allocation remains negative, suggesting that financing constraints, though relaxed, do not disappear.
Constrained segments of single segment refocusers also display a large increase in investment. Investment rises from 4% in year -1 to 8% in year +1, while relative investment allocation rises from -5% to 3%. A t-test for the change in relative investment allocation displays a p-value of 6%, while the p-value from a Wilcoxon test is 11%.
In contrast to constrained segments, refocusing is associated with a decline in investment for unconstrained segments. For diverse refocusers, investment in unconstrained segments declines from 9% in year -1 to 8% in year +1, and the change is statistically significant at the 5% level. For these segments, relative investment allocation also declines significantly after refocusing. A similar pattern is also observed for single segment refocusers. For their constrained segments, investment declines from 13% to 10%, while relative investment allocation declines from 6% to 4%.
These results demonstrate that investment in constrained segments rises substantially after refocusing, providing support for the financing hypothesis. If external capital market frictions prevent diversified firms from raising sufficient capital to exploit all positive NPV projects, and if divestitures provide a means of raising capital that allows retained segments to fund all positive NPV projects, the increase in investment should be positively related to changes in firm value.
Alternatively, it is possible that divestitures might simply provide a cash windfall to the retained segments beyond the level needed to fund valuable projects. If managers of retained segments prefer to maximize the size of their segments over paying out the free cash flow to investors, then the higher relative investment allocation might be symptomatic of an overinvestment problem. Therefore, to understand the effects of these changes in investment policy, we conduct an analysis of the changes in firm value surrounding refocusing in section V.
IV. B. Multivariate Analysis
We estimate the changes in the internal allocation of funds in a multivariate framework in Table 5 . Our tests estimate regressions of the ratio of capital expenditures to sales at the segment level following the approach of Shin and Stulz (1998) . Since we have panel data on segments, we use firm-fixed effects regressions, using data from three years prior to and three years after the divestiture. Because we are interested in how the functioning of internal capital markets change after a divestiture, we estimate the regressions with an indicator denoting post divestiture observations as well as interaction terms between this indicator and other explanatory variables. This allows the estimated coefficients on all variables, including the intercept, to vary from before to after the divestiture. As with the previous analysis, the models include only the segments that are retained by the firm following the divestiture to ensure that the results are not driven by the changing composition of the segments in the sample as a result of the divestiture. In addition, since we are interested in understanding how internal capital markets change after refocusing, we restrict this analysis to firms that continue to operate as diversified firms after the divestiture.
In model (1), we estimate the relation between segment capital expenditures and segment growth opportunities, as measured by imputed Tobin's q. Model (1) shows that, before the divestiture, the coefficient on Tobin's q is small and statistically insignificant. Thus, resources do not appear to be allocated to segments with the best investment opportunities, a finding that is in contrast to results in Shin and Stulz (1998) . The interaction between imputed q and the indicator denoting post-divestiture observations, while positive, is also statistically insignificant.
Model (2) indicating that the sensitivity of segment investment to cash flow increases after refocusing. It is also noteworthy that an F-test indicates that the sum of coefficients on segment q and the interaction between q and the post-divestiture indicator is positive and significant at the 9% level. This suggests that segment investment becomes sensitive to segment q after refocusing and implies an improvement in the functioning of the internal capital market after refocusing.
We augment the analysis in model (3) by including the cash flow of other segments. Before the divestiture, the cash flow of other segments is negative and significant. After the divestiture, however, cash flow of other segments is positively related to segment investment, implying an active reallocation of funds by the internal capital market. Overall, these investment regression results suggest an increase in the importance of segment q along with a decline in the importance of segment cash flow in determining segment investment, a pattern that is potentially consistent with an improvement in the internal investment allocation process. However, statistical support for the increased importance of q is weak in this framework, with the F-test for significance of q after refocusing significant at only the 10% level in model (2) and at the 15% level in model (3).
Model (2) and (3) also show that the coefficient on the indicator for post divestiture observations is significantly negative. Thus, investment levels for retained segments decline after the divestiture. This decline is consistent with at least two interpretations. According to Stein (1997) , if retained divisions were the former winners that received capital allocations from the divested division, the decline in investment would indicate that the internal capital market is less active in reallocating funds to these divisions. If internal capital markets create value, this change would be detrimental to firm value. Alternatively, reduced investment for segment segments might be valueenhancing. Berger and Ofek (1995) document that segments of diversified firms tend to overinvest relative to stand alone firms. Under this interpretation, the reduction in investment levels after refocusing might be viewed as evidence that segment overinvestment is curtailed. To disentangle these interpretations, we turn to analysis of the valuation effects of these changes.
IV. C. Analysis of Relative Value Added
An alternative approach to evaluating the functioning of internal capital markets is to assess the sensitivity of investment to q at the firm level. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a summary measure of the efficiency of investment allocation across all of a firm's segments. Rajan, where q is the sales weighted average of segment q's for the firm and q j is the median q ratio of single segment firms that operate exclusively in segment j.
The RVA measure is higher for firms when high q segments receive greater funds from the internal capital market and low q segments are larger suppliers to the internal capital market. Rajan et al (2000) show that RVA is positively related to firm value for diversified firms. Therefore, they argue that an increase in RVA represents a value-enhancing improvement in divisional investment allocation for diversified firms. Table 6 shows the RVA for sample firms. For multi-segment firms, the average RVA in year -1 is -0.26, which is significantly different from zero. Thus, there is clear evidence of suboptimality in internal capital allocation prior to refocusing. After the refocusing, RVA increases to -0.10 and is no longer significantly different from zero. The average change in RVA is 0.15 and statistically significantly different from zero. Although the medians are smaller in magnitude, they portray a qualitatively similar picture. Overall, for firms that remain diversified after refocusing, we find evidence of an improvement in the efficiency of internal capital market allocations. Table 6 also shows the relative value added measure for the subsample of single segment refocusers. The average RVA in year -1 for these firms is -0.08 and significantly different from zero.
Like the diversified refocusers, firms in the single segment refocusing sample also exhibit a pattern of distorted internal capital markets before refocusing. However, since these firms become single segment after refocusing, an internal capital market ceases to exist, and we are unable to compute the RVA measure after refocusing.
V. Valuation Effects of Internal Capital Market Changes
The evidence above shows that refocusing firms that remain diversified exhibit an improvement in internal capital markets as measured by RVA. Consistent with prior studies, we also find refocusing is associated with significant increases in value, as measured by changes in excess value. We now explore whether these effects are related. If improvements in internal capital allocations are an important source of gains in refocusing, we would expect to observe a positive association between improvements in excess value and changes in RVA. This is exactly what we find in Table 7 . As shown in model (1), changes in excess value from year -1 to year +1 are positively related to changes in RVA from year -1 to year +1. The point estimate suggests that a 10% increase in RVA increases excess value by almost 2%, suggesting a economically meaningful relation. Thus, internal capital markets seem to account for an important source of gains from refocusing.
We explore the predictions of various theories of internal capital markets to better understand the nature of these improvements. Meyers, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) , Rajan and Zingales (1995) , and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) all argue that divisions with poor investment prospects will engage in rent seeking because the opportunity cost of rent seeking behavior is the least for these divisions.
According to these arguments, diversified firms stand to gain the most by divesting divisions with poor investment opportunities. Schipper and Smith (1983) show that the change in focus is an important motivation underlying divestitures. We explore whether divestitures that increase the focus of the firm are associated with greater improvements in firm value. We use two measures of the degree to which a divestiture increases focus: the change in the sales-based Herfindahl index and an indicator for whether a non-core segment is divested.
According to Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) , misallocation of divisional investment is most severe when there is substantial dispersion in the investment opportunities of the divisions. This argument implies that firms have the most to gain from divestitures when they divest segments that contribute significantly to the dispersion in investment opportunities across the firm's segments. We use two variables to measure the impact of a divestiture on the diversity of investment opportunities.
First, we examine the change in the variance of imputed q resulting from the divestiture. Second, following Rajan et al (2000), we compute the change in the size-weighted standard deviation of imputed q among segments. According to their diversity hypothesis, the gains from refocusing should be larger when the divestiture results in a reduction in the diversity across segments.
Models (2) to (7) examine the extent to which the predictions of the internal capital market theories help explain the increase in firm value around refocusing. Model (2) shows that divesting a low q segment (i.e. a segment with a q lower than the median of all the firm's segments), is negatively associated with changes in firm value, contrary to the prediction of arguments by Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Meyer et al (1992) . However, as shown in model (3), the coefficient on low q divestitures is not robust to inclusion of indicators denoting poorly performing segments and small segments. When these additional divestiture characteristics are included, none of them are estimated to be significantly associated with changes in firm value. The change in RVA, however, remains positively and significantly associated with the change in firm value.
Models (4) and (5) explore whether increased focus affects the gains from divestitures. In model (4), we add the change in the sales-based Herfindahl index from year t-1 to year t+1, while model (5) uses an indicator to denote divestitures of non-core segments. Both specifications suggest that for firms that continue to operate as diversified entities, the change in focus is unrelated to changes in firm value. This finding seems to be in contrast to existing literature, which documents that change in focus is an important determinant of changes in firm value around refocusing transactions. A possible explanation for this apparent discrepancy in results is that prior work does not distinguish between whether or not firms continue to operate as diversified firms after refocusing. Table 3 shows that the change in excess value is much larger when firms become single segment firms, as opposed to remaining diversified after the divestiture. It is possible that change in focus is a more important determinant when firms reorganize to become single segment firms. We explore this in more depth below.
Models (6) and (7) include variables for the change in diversity as a result of the divestiture.
Neither the change in the variance of imputed q, or the change in the asset weighted variance measure, is reliably associated with changes in excess value.
Overall, all specifications reveal a positive and economically meaningful relation between changes in excess firm value and changes in the relative value added by internal capital markets.
Therefore, improvements in internal capital markets account for at least part of the change in firm value around refocusing events. However, event-specific characteristics suggested by theoretical models of internal capital markets, such as Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , Meyer et al (1992) , and Rajan et al (2000) do not appear to be important determinants of the gains surrounding divestitures.
We find no evidence that divesting poorly performing divisions, or those that contribute to the diversity of investment opportunities across divisions explains the variation in value increase around refocusing.
Next, we examine the valuation effects for firms that refocus to become single-segment entities. For these firms, lack of multiple divisions after refocusing precludes a computation of RVA.
Therefore, an alternative metric to measure changes in the remaining segment of the firm is needed.
For single-segment refocusers, we measure changes in investment policy using the change in relative investment allocation from year t-1 to t+1 instead. This measure is akin to an industry-adjusted change in investment for the retained segment, where only non-divesting stand-alone firms comprise the industry benchmark.
The drawback with using relative investment allocation is that a clear theoretical prediction on how changes in this variable should affect change in excess value is lacking. If, as is suggested by Berger and Ofek (1995) , segments of diversified firms tend to overinvest, then an increase in relative investment allocation should be negatively related to changes in excess firm value. Evidence of overinvestment by refocusers is lacking in our sample, however. As shown in Table 4 , relative investment allocation is essentially zero for this subsample in the year prior to refocusing.
Alternatively, it is possible that an increase in relative investment allocation is positively related to changes in firm value. This could be the case if, before refocusing, funds were diverted from retained segments to fund investment in other segments. In this scenario, retained segments could be constrained from pursuing the value-maximizing level of investment. By reorganizing the firm as a single segment firm, such investment constraints could be eliminated, allowing the retained segment to increase investment to optimal levels. In this case, an increase in relative investment allocation should be positively related to change in firm value.
To understand how the documented increase in relative investment allocation for single segment refocusers influences their gains from refocusing, we estimate regressions using the change in excess value from year -1 to +1 as the dependent variable and the corresponding change in relative investment allocation as an explanatory variable. Model (1) of Table 8 shows that the change in relative investment allocation is positively related to change in excess value. The coefficient on relative investment allocation is significant at the 6% level and suggests that a 10% increase in relative investment allocation is associated with a 4.5% increase in excess value. This suggests that the increase in relative investment allocation documented in Table 4 represents a value-enhancing change in divisional investment policy.
According to the financing hypothesis, increased investment should only be beneficial for segments that were initially constrained. To test this, model (2) includes an interaction term between the change in relative investment allocation and an indicator that equals 1 if the segment is constrained. As before, constrained segments are identified as those that were investing less than single-segment firms in the year prior to the divestiture.
Model (2) shows support for the financing hypothesis. The positive association between changes in relative investment allocation and changes in excess firm value is driven predominantly by firms with constrained segments. Additional models augment the analysis by including divestiture characteristics. Models (3) to (5) show that the change in excess value around refocusing does not depend upon whether the divested division has a high or low q, high or low cash flow, or is large or small relative to the retained division. Model (6) shows, however, that changes in the sales-based Herfindahl index are positively associated with changes in excess value, indicating that the degree to which a divestiture increases the focus is important in understanding the gains for reorganizing firms.
This finding is consistent with previous work by John and Ofek (1995) and Schipper and Smith (1983) who also show that change in focus is an important determinant of the gains from asset sales.
In our sample, however, focus is important in explaining increases in firm value from divestiture only for firms that refocus as single-segment firms. Model (7) of Table 8 shows that changes in value do not appear to depend upon whether a core division is divested. In all specifications, the change in relative investment allocation is estimated to be positive and significant at the 10% level or lower.
Overall, these results indicate support for the financing hypothesis, which predicts that asset sales can enhance firm value by providing a source for funding valuable investment opportunities and by breaking up a value reducing internal capital market.
VI. Conclusions
Diversified firms are, on average, valued at a discount relative to stand-alone single segment firms. Internal capital markets of diversified firms tend to allocate capital suboptimally across divisions. In recent years, there has been an increasing trend to undo diversification and increase corporate focus. In this paper, we show that these phenomenon are related.
Our evidence comes from a sample of refocusing firms that reduce the number of reported business segments by divesting or spinning off assets. We study how this change in organizational structure affects the allocation of capital across divisions. We show that, on average, such refocusing is associated with significant increases in relative value added, indicating an improved allocation of capital across divisions for firms that remain diversified. Our sample firms also exhibit substantial increases in excess firm value around the refocusing and these increases are higher in cases where the improvement in relative value added is greater. Firms that reorganize as single segment firms display an increase in investment relative to stand alone firms and this increase is also positively associated with changes in excess firm value around refocusing. Thus, changes in the functioning of internal capital markets contribute at least partially to the increase in firm value from refocusing. This evidence identifies a specific mechanism by which firms improve the management of their remaining assets after refocusing. Table 2 reports mean (median) summary statistics for divested and retained segments. The imputed q of a segment is the median q of all single segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code as the segment. Segment cash flow is the segment operating income plus depreciation. A segment is defined as low q, low cash flow, or small if its q, cash flow to sales ratio, or assets, respectively, is lower than the median of the firm's segments. A divestiture is classified as variance of q decreasing if the variance of the firm's segments' imputed q declines between T-1 and T+1. The diversity of a firm is the standard deviation of its segments' sales weighted imputed q divided by the average q of all the firm's segments. A divestiture is classified as diversity decreasing if the diversity measure declines between T-1 and T+1. A non-core divestiture are those where the firm's primary 3 digit SIC code differs from the divested segment's 3 digit SIC code. A firm year is dropped if any segment's cash flow to sales ratio is less than -2 or greater than 2 or if any segment's capital expenditures to sales ratio is less than 0 or greater than 1. The diverse refocusers sample consists of firms that remain diversified firms after the divestiture. The single segment refocusers sample consists of firms that report a single segment after the divestiture. The change in focus variables are tested to determine if they are different from zero using t-tests and the Wilcoxon Rank-sum tests: a, b, and c indicate significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.
Full Table 3 reports the mean, median and change in the diversification discount using Berger and Ofek (1995) methods with a sales multiplier. A firm year is dropped if any segment's cash flow to sales ratio is less than -2 or greater than 2 or if any segment's capital expenditures to sales ratio is less than 0 or greater than 1. The diverse refocusers sample consists of firms that remain diversified firms after the divestiture. The single segment refocusers sample consists of firms that report a single segment after the divestiture. Pvalues from t-tests and signed rank tests of a difference from zero are reported in parentheses.
Year T-1 Year T+1 Table 4 Investment Allocation Around Divestitures Table 4 reports the mean (median) ratio of investment allocation, segment capital expenditures to sales, and relative investment allocation, investment allocation minus the median of the investment allocation for all single segment firms operating in the same 3 digit SIC code. Constrained Segments are those that invest less than single-segment firms in year t-1. A firm year is dropped if any segment's cash flow to sales ratio is less than -2 or greater than 2 or if any segment's capital expenditures to sales ratio is less than 0 or greater than 1. Only retained segments are included in the analysis. The diverse refocusers sample consists of firms that remain diversified firms after the divestiture. The single segment refocusers sample consists of firms that report a single segment after the divestiture. Table 5 reports the results from regressing segment capital expenditures to sales on several segment characteristics for the sample of multi-segment divestitures for the three years prior to and subsequent to the event. Segment imputed q is the median of the single segment q in the same 3-digit SIC code if 5 firms are in same SIC code, otherwise median in the 2-digit SIC is used. Cash flow is the operating income plus depreciation. All regressions are fixed effects by firm. Only retained segments are in divestiture analysis. A firm year is dropped if any segment's cash flow to sales ratio is less than -2 or greater than 2 or if any segment's capital expenditures to sales ratio is less than 0 or greater than 1. The diverse refocusers sample consists of firms that remain diversified firms after the divestiture. The single segment refocusers sample consists of firms that report a single segment after the divestiture. P-values in parentheses and the f-statistic and corresponding p-value testing if the coefficient plus the after interaction with the after dummy is presented in the bottom of each column.
(1) Table 6 reports the mean and median relative value added for single and multi-segment firms for the T-1, T+1, and the change between these two years. Only the T-1 period is reported for single segment firms since these firms have only one segment after the divestiture. Relative value added is defined as: is the median capital expenditure to sales ratio for single segment firms in the corresponding industry, q is the sales weighted average of segment q's for the firm and q j is the median q ratio of single segment firms that operate exclusively in segment j's industry. For all industry variables, the median of single segment firms in the same 3 digit SIC code is used as long as there are 5 firms in the industry, otherwise the median for those in the same 2 digit SIC code is used. A firm year is dropped if any segment's cash flow to sales ratio is less than -2 or greater than 2 or if any segment's capital expenditures to sales ratio is less than 0 or greater than 1. The diverse refocusers sample consists of firms that remain diversified firms after the divestiture. The single segment refocusers sample consists of firms that report a single segment after the divestiture. P-values from a t-tests and signed rank test for difference from zero are reported in parentheses. Table 7 reports the results from regressing the change in the excess value, presented in Table 3 , on the change in the relative value added and variables that characterize the divested segment for the multi-segment sample. The imputed q of a segment is the median q of all single segment firms in the same 3 digit SIC code as the segment. If fewer than 5 firms have the same 3 digit SIC code, then a 2 digit SIC code is used. Segment cash flow is operating income plus depreciation. A segment is defined as low q, low cash flow, or small if its q, cash flow to sales ratio, or assets, respectively, is lower than the median of the firm's segments. A divestiture is classified as variance of q decreasing if the variance of the firm's segments' imputed q declines between T-1 and T+1. The diversity of a firm is the standard deviation of its segments' sales weighted imputed q divided by the average q of all the firm's segments. A divestiture is classified as diversity decreasing if the diversity measure declines between T-1 and T+1. A non-core divestiture are those where the firm's primary 3 digit SIC code differs from the divested segment's 3 digit SIC code. A firm year is dropped if any segment's cash flow to sales ratio is less than -2 or greater than 2 or if any segment's capital expenditures to sales ratio is less than 0 or greater than 1. The diverse refocusers sample consists of firms that remain diversified firms after the divestiture. The single segment refocusers sample consists of firms that report a single segment after the divestiture. P-values in parentheses and tests of significance use White standard errors (White (1980) ).
(1) Table 8 reports the results from regressing the change in the excess value, presented in Table 3 , on the change in relative investment allocation and variables that characterize the divested segment for the single segment sample. The imputed q of a segment is the median q of all single segment firms in the same 3 digit SIC code as the segment. If fewer than 5 firms have the same 3 digit SIC code, then a 2 digit SIC code is used. Segment cash flow is operating income plus depreciation. A segment is defined as low q, low cash flow, or small if its q, cash flow to sales ratio, or assets, respectively, is lower than the median of the firm's segments. A divestiture is classified as variance of q decreasing if the variance of the firm's segments' imputed q declines between T-1 and T+1. The diversity of a firm is the standard deviation of its segments' sales weighted imputed q divided by the average q of all the firm's segments. A divestiture is classified as diversity decreasing if the diversity measure declines between T-1 and T+1. A non-core divestiture are those where the firm's primary 3 digit SIC code differs from the divested segment's 3 digit SIC code. A firm year is dropped if any segment's cash flow to sales ratio is less than -2 or greater than 2 or if any segment's capital expenditures to sales ratio is less than 0 or greater than 1. The diverse refocusers sample consists of firms that remain diversified firms after the divestiture. The single segment refocusers sample consists of firms that report a single segment after the divestiture. P-values in parentheses and tests of significance use White standard errors (White (1980) 
